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ABSTRACT
The distinction between function and role is a vexed and difficult
one. While the distinction appears to be useful, in practice it is hard
to apply; this can be even worse when applying this distinction to
biology. In this paper, I take an evolutionary approach, considering
a series of examples, to develop and generate definitions for
these concepts. I test them in practice against work performed
on the Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI). Finally, I
give an axiomatisation and discuss methods for applying these
definitions in practice. Availability: http://homepages.cs.ncl.
ac.uk/phillip.lord/function/
1 INTRODUCTION
Large parts of modern biology are aimed at answering the question:
what is the function of this? Much of the Gene Ontology deals
with molecular function (Ashburner et al., 2000). In dealing with
the social aspects of science, roles are similarly important. It is
clear, therefore, that function and role are important concepts in
biomedical ontologies and are prime candidates for inclusion in an
upper ontology. A coherent, consistent and shared definition for
function and role is likely to decrease the effort required to integrate
independently developed ontologies.
A number of groups are currently using one upper ontology,
the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO)1 which includes a definition
of function. However, the definition is not naturally applicable to
biology; it is not clear, for instance, that GO’s molecular functions
are also BFO functions, as discussed in Section 2.1. An alternative
framework is available within the General Formal Ontology (GFO),
which provides an ontology of function (Burek et al., 2006).
This ontology provides a more extensive framework for describing
functions but, in itself, does not define biological function. Despite
this, there is a reasonable degree of informal agreement among
biologists as to the meaning of the word. Conversely, while the
definition for role seems clear, many people have difficulties in
applying it in practice.
In this paper, I address two key issues relating to modeling
function and role coherently for biomedical ontologies. These
are: how we unify the definitions of function as they apply to
artifacts and to life; and, how do we differentiate between roles and
functions? I do this by considering illustrative examples where the
answers are reasonably clear and evolve a definition from them. I
then consider examples of the application of current definitions from
BFO in a practical biomedical use. Finally, I offer a axiomatisation
in OWL, stemming from our definitions and consider briefly how
these definitions could be applied in practice.
1 http://www.ifomis.org/bfo
2 FUNCTION
2.1 Biological Function
First, consider the current definition of function provided by BFO
(see Def: 1).
DEFINITION 1. Function is a realizable entity the manifestation
of which is an essentially end-directed activity of a continuant entity
being a specific kind of entity in the kind or kinds of context that it
is made for
As a simple example, a hammer (the continuant entity) was
made to hammer nails (the function) in a hammering process (the
end-directed activity). This definition is problematic for biological
systems. The problem here is straight forward: most biological
systems were not made or designed for any purpose.
Although, it has not been incorporated into BFO yet, there is a
potential definition for “Biological Function” which would become
a new child of Function (Def: 2) (Arp and Smith, 2008).
DEFINITION 2. A biological function is a function which inheres
in an independent continuant that is i) part of an organism and ii)
exists and has the physical structure as a result of the coordinated
expression of that organism’s structural genes.
As an example, a foot (the independent continuant) is part of an
organism, exists, and developed in a controlled way as a result of
gene expression.
There are some difficulties with this definition. Terminologically,
we would normally expect coordination to have a coordinator. More
substantially, consider the following examples: a differentiated
tumour has its structure through coordinated expression of its genes,
it exists and it engages in end-directed activity. A male ant has its
structure as a result of gene expression, and engages in end-directed
activity; however, it is not part of an organism2. From this, we
conclude that a differentiated tumour does, indeed, have a function
(growing). A male ant, however does not have a function. We can
also consider molecular function: the physical structure of a protein
is independent of the expression of an organisms structural genes
– only its presence depends on this. A protein, therefore, does not
have a function, by this definition. So, there are two key problems:
the definition does not work for entities above or below a certain
size. Also most biological entities have their structure as a result
of coordinated expression. I offer the following alternate definition
(Def: 3).
DEFINITION 3. A biological function is a realizable entity that
inheres in a continuant which is realized in an activity, and where
2 Or at least not a proper part of
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the homologous structure(s) of individuals of closely related (or the
same) species bear this same biological function.
The definition given uses the notion of homology; evolution is
key to our understanding of biology and it is appropriate that it
should be used to define biological function. If a biological structure
has a function, then this function will have evolved along with the
structure; so, other structures with a common evolutionary descent
will display the same behaviour. This definition also mirrors closely
normal biological practice; the most common way to determine
the function of an unknown structure is to look for function of a
homologous structure.
It should be noted that this definition of biological function is
not circular, although it has itself as part of its definition; rather it
is recursive; a chimp hand and a human hand can have the same
function because of each other. It does require that a structure must
have a homolog for it to have a function. It does not require that
these homologous structures be extant.
Applying this to our examples: the tumour now has no function
because it has no homologs (different tumours arise as independent
events and share no common ancestor). Likewise, the activity of
the male ant now clearly is a function, as many different, related
organisms behave in a similar way. Finally, a protein may have
a function depending on the activity of its homologs. In short,
this definition results in the same conclusions as our biological
understanding.
2.2 Relating the Functions
Next we consider the relationship between function and its
biological, artifactual subclasses. Taking an illustrative example,
consider the sole of my foot and the sole of my shoe3. They
appear to operate to: provide a frictional surface to enable motion;
provide padding to reduce shock to everything above; be tough
enough to resist abrasion. They would appear to have the same
function; indeed, like many artifacts, we would guess that the
shoe owes much of its design to mimicry of biology. It would
seem, therefore, sensible that instances of Shock Resistance could
be either a biological or artifactual function. The alternative would
be to duplicate many functions under both subclasses (“biological
shock resistance”, and “artifactual shock resistance”) with very
similar definitions. Only functions such as reproduction have to be
a biological function, while liquifying iron can never be. In short,
whether an instance of function is biological or artifactual should be
determined from the nature of the entity in which it inheres, rather
than the process by which it is realized. We therefore offer a simple
definition of function which reflects this (Def 4).
DEFINITION 4. A function is a realizable entity which is a
biological function or an artifactual function.
For the purposes of this paper, I note that the definition given
for function earlier (Def 1), can serve as a reasonable definition for
artifactual function.
It is also interesting that this definition covers some unusual
but non-pathological examples. Take a bacteria whose colonies
change colour depending on the presence of a toxin and which was
produced using synthetic biology techniques. The components have
3 The author acknowledges that neither rank among his best features
all evolved, but the organisation has not. Is the detection of the toxin
then a biological or artifactual function? This is clearly a difficult, if
uninspiring, question but given Def 4, one we can avoid by simply
describing it as a function; alternatively, we can describe it as both a
biological or artifactual function, suggesting strongly that these two
classes should not be disjoint.
3 ROLES
Next, having considered the definition of function and its
applicability to biology, we consider the issue of roles. The current
definition (Def: 5) is complex. More simply, it suggests that the
entity having that role can be involved in an activity but that it was
not necessarily intended for, nor necessarily has the structure for
this.
DEFINITION 5. A realizable entity the manifestation of which
brings about some result or end that is not essential to a continuant
in virtue of the kind of thing that it is but that can be served or
participated in by that kind of continuant in some kinds of natural,
social or institutional contexts.
Consider the relationship between role and function. Again, we
shall consider a simple biological example, in this case of a man
walking on his hands. By our earlier definition (Def: 3), “to walk on
hands” is not a function. While the homologous structure is, indeed,
used for walking on in all closely related species, most humans do
not walk on their hands. It would, therefore appear to be a role. In
this context the hand has a role of Shock Resistance. This realizable
entity also appears in the hands of many other primates; in this case,
however, it would appear to be a function of the primate hand, as it
is a function of their feet.
We are left with a similar conclusion as previously. As well
as concluding that Shock Resistance maybe either a biological or
artifactual function, we must also conclude that the individuals
of the same class can be a role, depending on the nature of
the relationship between the independent continuant and realizable
entity.
3.1 OBI as a case study
So far, in this paper, we have considered a number of illustrative
examples and used these to draw conclusions about definitions for
functions and roles. This methodology is appropriate, but has the
limitation that the choice of other examples may have led us to
different conclusions. In this section, therefore, I will consider the
use that OBI (Ontology for Biomedical Investigations) has made of
function and role 4. I choose to use OBI as it was built after BFO and
with knowledge of it; many of the ontologies available from OBO
were started without this use or knowledge.
Considering first the functions; OBI has 48 different functions.
Can these functions be fulfilled by an entity which was not designed
for the purpose? As shown in Table 1, most of them can, often by
considering a highly generic device (like a computer) or organism
(like a human). Some are highly generic in themselves and can
be performed by many things (heat for example). Some can only
be functions but because the definitions are truistic (for example,
Device Function; Device is defined as something “designed [..] to
4 Analysis was performed on OBI take from subversion, Revision: 1369
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Function Bearer OBI Function
Human Perturbe, Measure (2), Separation (4),
Sort
Computer Information Processor (4), Consume
Data
Highly Generic Produce Data (2), Freeze, Heat,
Environment Control, Mechanical,
Record, Contain (2), Transfer, Cool,
Connection, Synthesizing, Excitation
(2), Ionization
Distant Galaxy Magnify
Truisms Device (9), Energy Supply (2)
Out of Scope Molecular Function (6)
Table 1. OBI Functions considered as Roles.I provide suggestions for
entities that could engage in the same end-directed activity, but without
being designed for the purpose. “Function” has been omitted from the OBI
term names. Numbers indicate child terms which have been omitted for
brevity. I do not consider “Information Processor” to be the function of a
computer, as the definition is more specific than the term suggests.
perform a specific function”). I consider “Molecular Function” to
be out-of-scope for this paper as it is not clear whether it fulfils the
BFO definition of function.
Next, we consider OBI roles. There are many more roles than
functions – 100+ in fact. Due to the size, here we consider whole
branches of the role hierarchy.
First, many classes relate to human or societal processes; for
example, the regulatory role (in the sense of ethical rather than
transcriptional regulation), or study personnel (clinical laboratory
worker, principle investigator). Most of these, do indeed appear
to be roles and can only ever be roles. I note, however, that
even here there are counter examples; robots are common place in
laboratories now, and often perform the tasks previously fulfilled by
humans, even the task of designing the next experiment (King et al.,
2004). These robots are normally designed specifically for a given
purpose, which means they are fulfilling their function; note that as
technology advances, robots may become more generic; now they
will be fulfilling a role, again.
Second, there are a set of roles relating to reagents and their states.
While label role (defined as a reagent role realized in a detection
of label assay) seems sensible, is S35 CTP not manufactured
specifically for this purpose? It certainly does not occur in nature.
Finally, let us consider reference roles (a role which can support
the observation of similarities, differences, relative magnitude or
change). In many cases, biological assays use a reference which
is not manufactured. However, consider λ-HindIII fragments, a
calibration standard or the international kilogram prototype. These
would all appear to function as an reference and have been produced
specifically for this purpose.
As a result of this analysis, we suggest a modification to the
current definition of role (Defn 5). Both roles and functions
can become apparent (realized) in natural, social or institutional
contexts. That such a context exists does not provide a clear
differentation between role and function; the critical distinction
relates to whether the entity in question was designed or has evolved
to be engaged in a given process. I suggest, therefore, this alternate
and simpler definition for role (Defn 6).
DEFINITION 6. A realizable entity the manifestation of which
brings about some result or end that is not essential to a continuant
because of its kind.
In short, from this case study, I conclude that the role/function
distinction is not clear. While OBI has a specific intent in mind
with its application of the distinction (broadly and not exhaustively,
social or experimental roles, device or instrument functions), this
distinction is not the distinction made in the current definitions
of role and function; further given that most functions could also
appear to be roles, and many roles appear to also be functions, I
suggest that the distinction made in the current definitions is not
useful in the context of OBI.
4 AN AXIOMATISATION FOR FUNCTION AND
ROLE
I have produced an axiomatisation in OWL of functions and roles as
defined in this paper; due to space considerations we report here key
differences between this and the BFO axiomatisation; it is available
as described in the abstract.
• There is an explicit relationship between RealizableEntity
and Process. Subclasses use a more specific relationship.
So, a ToAbsorbShock function may only be realized by a
AbsorbtionOfShock process, if it is realized at all.
• Function and Role are defined classes. Stating that an
instance of ToAbsorbShock is function of instance of
FootSole implies, therefore, that the former is a function.
• Most leaves of RealizableEntity are direct children of
RealizableEntity, with a few exceptions (ToReproduce
is a child of BiologicalFunction).
The definitions could be extended further; for simplicity, we have
not added classes to differentiate between organisms and artifacts.
These could be added to automate the population of Biological
and ArtifactualFunction.
At the current time, it remains an open question whether Role,
Function and its children should be disjoint. The key example
of the function of a synthetic biological organism suggests that
Biological and ArtifactualFunction function should
not be disjoint (as it appears to be both), but I have no example
which suggests whether Role and Function should be disjoint.
In axiomatisating the examples given, these disjoint statements
make no practical difference.
Many ontologies are built using the OBO format; while this has a
slightly weaker semantics than OWL it is possible to represent much
of OWL in a OBO (Golbreich et al., 2007). The axiomatisation
presented here can be represented using “union” and “intersection
of” to describe classes, which is usually translated as a definition.
The universal link between RealizableEntity and Process
has no natural equivalent. However, as this link its own specific
relationship which is restricted to this use, problems caused by the
lack of an inexact semantic equivalent are likely to be relatively
minor.
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The axiomatisation presented here is related to that produced
by others (Dumontier, 2008; Burek et al., 2006); the first of these
focuses more on roles, while the later provides for a more complex
representation, which covers issues such as preconditions.
5 APPLYING THE DEFINITIONS IN PRACTICE
Finally, we consider whether these definitions are applicable; for a
given set of entities how do we decide whether we have a function
(of either subclass) or a role.
The definition of an artifactual function easily allows its
application: first, we determine whether the entity in question is an
organism or part of one (which it shouldn’t be); second, we could
ask whoever produced the entity what it was designed for. Of course,
the second may not always be possible, in which case, we can guess
from its design what its purpose is. In most cases, these will provide
a clear answer.
For biological function, the situation is less clear. Whether an
entity is an organism or part of one is, in practice, likely to be
straightforward for extant entities; otherwise, we are can apply
palentological techniques. Likewise, identification of closely related
species, and homologous structures is well known as it forms the
basis of taxonomy. While developing an exact definition for “closely
related” is outside the scope of this paper, it is possible.
The definition that I introduce for Function in this paper (Defn
4) is conjunctive; it is either biological or artifactual. Here I
have given little evidence that these are the only kind of function.
Fundamentally, these two arise from very different mechanisms.
There could be other appropriate subclasses of function; the most
obvious possibility would be Chemical Function. However, artifacts
are designed by humans who understand, mimic and improve on
biology by building tools. It is this mimicry that we wish to
reflect with a common definition joining biological and artifactual
function; this is not true for Chemical Function.
To determine whether something is a role, it is possible to make
a determination on the basis of whether the context is optional (Arp
and Smith, 2008). However, this optionality is a difficult criteria;
firstly, all RealizableEntity’s are optional in the sense that they
might never be realized and, secondly, the optionality can depend
on how specifically we define the bearer. A hammer is not designed
to hammer nails, as claimed earlier, it is designed to hit things; a
nail hammer is designed to hit nails, a toffee hammer to hit toffee,
a warhammer to hit anyone who irritates you. In practice, a role can
be considered to be a negative definition; if, there is a continuant
and an end-directed activity that the continuant can be involved in,
and this involvement is known not to fulfil the definition of either
function, then, we have a role.
In this paper, we have considered OBI and found that the
distinction between role and function is hard to apply; this is not
true for all ontologies. For example, consider the Gene Ontology.
In many cases, the homology will be considered as a standard part
of the operating procedure5 in determining the function of a gene
product; regardless the evidence codes would allow us to make the
distinction. We can conclude, therefore, that when GO is used to
annotate a protein, this describes a biological function rather than a
role.
5 http://www.geneontology.org/GO.evidence.shtml
6 DISCUSSION
Here, I have taken an evolutionary approach to function and role,
by considering examples and using this to derive definitions which
are as consistent as possible with current use within biomedical
sciences. These have been encoded in an axiomatisation which
should enable the use of these definitions in a machine interpretable
way.
The applicability of these definitions is a key advantage; the
current distinction being made between function and role is a hard
one to understand and apply. Our definition distinguishes between
the two based on the nature of the relationship to the independent
continuant in which they inhere. I suggest that it is very hard to
make the distinction at the class level; our study of OBI shows that
very few of the functions and roles clearly fall into one category or
another. For an individual continuant bearing a realizable entity, this
distinction appears to be much more straight forward.
I also provide a definition of biological function, something
that is currently lacking from BFO. I have paid close attention
to current biological usage; the definition is close to the process
used to determine function. Moreover, it is highly applicable; all
parts of the definition are measurable. It is for this reason, for
instance, that I have avoided a definition based on the outcome
of selective pressure; this is hard to test in most circumstances,
requiring expensive evolutionary studies, and impossible for extinct
species. Serendipitously, it also avoids difficult questions about
artificial selection; we can state clearly that cows do not have a
function of producing beef, though this is the outcome of selection.
Importantly, my definition of biological function works across
multiple levels of granularity: organisms and organism part through
to genes and molecules; this is not true of previous definitions (Arp
and Smith, 2008), which cover only anatomy. While the coverage
of the definition is useful, I tend to side with Dumontier (2008) who
suggests that for molecules the (biological) function/role distinction
may be redundant.
In summary, I believe that the definitions and axiomatisation
given in this paper make a significant contribution to the use of
role and function in biomedical ontologies. They should enable a
consistent use of these classes, because they consider current usage
of the terms and the applicability of these definitions. I seek not to
change current use but to formalize it.
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